Robustness of Maximal $\alpha$-Leakage to Side Information by Liao, Jiachun et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
1.
07
10
5v
2 
 [c
s.I
T]
  5
 A
pr
 20
19
Robustness of Maximal α-Leakage to Side
Information
Jiachun Liao, Lalitha Sankar, Oliver Kosut
School of Electrical, Computer and Energy Engineering,
Arizona State University
Email: {jiachun.liao,lalithasankar,okosut}@asu.edu
Flavio P. Calmon
School of Engineering and Applied Sciences
Harvard University
Email: flavio@seas.harvard.edu
Abstract—Maximal α-leakage is a tunable measure of infor-
mation leakage based on the accuracy of guessing an arbitrary
function of private data based on public data. The parameter
α determines the loss function used to measure the accuracy
of a belief, ranging from log-loss at α = 1 to the probability
of error at α = ∞. To study the effect of side information on
this measure, we introduce and define conditional maximal α-
leakage. We show that, for a chosen mapping (channel) from
the actual (viewed as private) data to the released (public) data
and some side information, the conditional maximal α-leakage
is the supremum (over all side information) of the conditional
Arimoto channel capacity where the conditioning is on the side
information. We prove that if the side information is conditionally
independent of the public data given the private data, the side
information cannot increase the information leakage.
I. INTRODUCTION
The performance of security and privacy systems can vary
significantly depending on the side information available to an
adversary (see, for example, [1], [2]). In general, it is difficult
to account for the specific implementation intricacies of real-
world privacy mechanisms when determining the risk posed
by adversarial side information. Instead, a more tractable
approach is to asses the side-information resilience of the
privacy (or information leakage) metric used to design a given
mechanism. Ideally, a privacy metric should quantify not only
the risk incurred against an adversary that observes the output
of the system, but also capture the robustness against different
amounts of side information an adversary may have.
Despite the array of (often overlapping) privacy/information
leakage measures proposed over the past decade, few metrics
ensure robustness against side information. Differential privacy
(DP) [3], for example, captures privacy in the context of
querying statistical databases. One of the key advantages of
DP is that it is robust to arbitrary external knowledge (side
information). This robustness is formalized in [4], wherein the
authors model side information by a prior probability distribu-
tion on the support of the original dataset. More recently, Issa
et al. introduced maximal leakage (MaxL), which is essentially
the maximal logarithmic gain in the probability of correctly
guessing any arbitrary function of original data from released
data [5]. The impact of side information on MaxL was studied
in [5]. In our previous work, we introduced maximal α-leakage
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as a measure of information leakage, which is proved to
be related to Sibson and Arimoto mutual information, and
incorporates MaxL [6].
In this work, we characterize the robustness of maximal α-
leakage to side information. We model side information as a
random variable observed by an adversary that is interested
in learning an arbitrary function of the original data from the
released data. We represent this as a conditional Markov chain,
which is also used by Issa et al. to study the effect of side infor-
mation on maxL [5, Def. 6]. This formulation naturally leads
to the definition of conditional maximal α-leakage, which is an
extended version of maximal α-leakage that accounts for side
information. We demonstrate that maximal α-leakage upper
bounds conditional maximal α-leakage if the side information
is conditionally independent of the released data given the
original data. That is, maximal α-leakage is robust to arbitrary
side information that is not used in generating the released data
from the original data. This surprising result provides further
motivation for using α-leakage as a robust and tunable privacy
metric. Finally, other metrics of note that may be amenable
to such analysis include probability of correct guessing [7],
total variation-based metrics [8], and metrics based on Re´nyi
divergence [9].
II. PRELIMINARIES
We begin by reviewing maximal α-leakage. To do so, we
first present Sibson MI [10] and Arimoto MI [11].
Definition 1. Let X and Y be two discrete random variables
where (X,Y ) ∼ PXY , The Sibson MI of order α ∈ (0, 1) ∪
(1,∞) is given by
ISα(X ;Y ) =
α
α− 1
log
∑
y
(∑
x
PX(x)PY |X(y|x)
α
) 1
α
. (1)
The Arimoto MI of order α ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1,∞) is defined as
IAα(X ;Y ) , Hα(X)−Hα(X |Y )
=
α
α− 1
log
∑
y
(∑
x
PX (x)
αPY |X(y|x)
α
∑
x
PX (x)α
) 1
α
,
(2)
(3)
where Hα is Re´nyi entropy [12] and Hα(X |Y ) is Arimoto
conditional entropy of X given Y defined as
Hα(X |Y ) =
α
1− α
log
∑
y
(∑
x
PX (x)
αPY |X(y|x)
α
) 1
α
. (4)
All of these quantities are defined by their continuous exten-
sions for α = 1 or ∞. Note that both the Sibson and Arimoto
MIs reduce to the Shannon MI at α = 1.
Let X and Y represent the original (private) data and
released (public) data, respectively, and let U represent an
arbitrary (potentially random) function of X that the observer
(a curious or malicious user with access to the released data
Y ) is interested in learning. We introduced maximal α-leakage
in [6, Def. 5] to quantify an adversary’s ability to infer any
function (ranging from the maximal likely realization to the
posterior distribution) of data X from the released Y . We
review the definition below.
Definition 2 (Maximal α-Leakage). Given a joint distribution
PX,Y on finite alphabets X × Y , the maximal α-leakage, for
1 ≤ α ≤ ∞, from X to Y is defined as
Lmaxα (X → Y )
, sup
U−X−Y
lim
α′→α
α′
α′ − 1
log
max
P
Û|Y
E
[
P
Û |Y (U |Y )
α′−1
α′
]
max
P
Û
E
[
P
Û
(U)
α′−1
α′
] ,
=


sup
PX˜
ISα(X˜;Y ) = sup
PX˜
IAα(X˜ ;Y ), 1 < α ≤ ∞
I(X ;Y ), α = 1
,
(5)
(6)
where (i) in (5) U represents any function of X and takes
values from an arbitrary alphabet, and the objective function
is defined as the α-leakage from U to Y ; (ii) ISα and I
A
α in (6)
indicate Sibson and Arimoto MIs, respectively [10], [11].
Note that the optimal P ∗
Uˆ|Y
of the maximization in the
numerator of the logarithmic term in (5) minimizes the ex-
pectation of the following α-loss function
ℓα(u, y, PUˆ|Y ) =
α
α− 1
(
1− P
Uˆ |Y (u|y)
α−1
α
)
, (7)
for each α ∈ (1,∞). The limit of the loss function in (7) leads
to the 0-1 loss (for α = 1) and the probability of (guessing)
error (for α = ∞) functions, respectively. Consequently, for
α = 1 and∞, maximal α-leakage simplifies to MI and MaxL,
respectively. For α > 1, maximal α-leakage is essentially the
Arimoto channel capacity (with a support-set constrained input
distribution) [11].
III. CONDITIONAL TUNABLE INFORMATION LEAKAGE
MEASURES
Given a pair of original and released data (X,Y ), let Z
be the knowledge of some particular adversary or third-party
about (X,Y ). Before introducing the conditional maximal
α-leakage, we introduce the following simpler measure, the
conditional α-leakage. Here, the adversary is interested only
in guessing X , rather than a function of X .
Definition 3 (Conditional α-Leakage). Given a joint distribu-
tion PXY Z and an estimator Xˆ with the same support as X ,
the α-leakage from X to Y given Z is defined as
Lα(X → Y |Z)
,
α
α− 1
log
max
P
Xˆ|Y,Z
E
[
P
Xˆ|Y,Z(X |Y, Z)
α−1
α
]
max
P
Xˆ|Z
E
[
P ˆX|Z(X |Z)
α−1
α
] (8)
for 1 < α < ∞ and by the continuous extension of (8) for
α = 1 and ∞.
The conditional α-leakage quantifies the maximal logarith-
mic gain in inferring various information about X when an
adversary with arbitrary side information Z has access to Y .
To understand the effect of the side information Z on leakage
about any function U of X through Y , we define conditional
maximal α-leakage as follows.
Definition 4 (Maximal Conditional α-Leakage). Given a joint
distribution PXY Z , for 1 ≤ α ≤ ∞, the conditional maximal
α-leakage from X to Y given Z is defined as
Lmaxα (X → Y |Z) , sup
U :U−X−Y |Z
Lα(U → Y |Z) (9)
where U represents any function of X and takes values from
an arbitrary alphabet. Moreover, the expression U −X−Y |Z
represents the conditional Markov chain constraint where
PUXY |Z(uxy|z) = P (x|z)P (u|xz)P (y|xz). (10)
Therefore, the conditional Markov chain U − X − Y |Z is
equivalent to U − (X,Z)− Y .
Note that conditional maximal α-leakage takes side infor-
mation Z into consideration via the conditional Markov chain
U − X − Y |Z , which is equivalent to U − (X,Z) − Y .
Therefore, conditional maximal α-leakage is designed under
the two assumptions: side information Z can be arbitrarily
related to X and U , and the released data Y will not provide
more information about U than X and Z .
The Markov chain U − X − Y models inferences for a
function U of X from Y . To involve side information Z in
the inferences, beyond the conditional Markov chain in Def.
4, there are two other possibilities:
(i) If the side information Z that an adversary has is ar-
bitrarily related to the function of interest U , but con-
ditionally independent of released data Y given X , we
have (U,Z)−X−Y . For example, if X is an individual’s
public records without voter registration indicated by Z
and Y is a noisy release ofX , then when U is the political
preference of this person, Z can provide extra information
about U and is conditionally independent of Y given X .
(ii) If the side information Z does not provide more infor-
mation about the function of interest U than original data
X does, but can be arbitrarily related to the released data
Y , we have U − X − (Y, Z). For example, if X is an
individual’s public records with voter registration, Z is a
noisy release of the voter registration in X , and Y is an
update of Z , then when U is the political preference of
this person, Z cannot provide extra information about U
than X does but it can be helpful in inferring U from Y
(i.e., the Markov chain Z −X − Y does not hold).
Note that in either Markov chain mentioned above, U and Y
are conditionally independent given X and Z . In this sense,
the proposed conditional Markov chain generally models side
information in privacy-protection problems.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we explore the effect of side information on
inferring any function of original data from released data. First,
we simplify the expression of conditional maximal α-leakage,
and then, compare leakages of a privacy mechanism measured
by conditional maximal α-leakage and maximal α-leakage.
The following theorem simplifies the expression of the
conditional α- leakage in (8) as a conditional Arimoto MI
based on Arimoto conditional entropy.
Definition 5. Given a joint distribution PX,Y,Z , the condi-
tional Arimoto mutual information, for 1 ≤ α ≤ ∞, between
X and Y given Z is defined as
IAα(X ;Y |Z) , H
A
α(X |Z)−H
A
α(X |Y Z) (11)
where HAα(·|·) indicates Arimoto conditional entropy.
Note that for α = 1, the conditional Arimoto MI in (11) is
exactly the conditional Shannon MI I(X ;Y |Z).
Theorem 1. For α ∈ [1,∞], conditional α-leakage defined in
(8) simplifies to
Lα(X → Y |Z) = I
A
α(X ;Y |Z). (12)
The proof hinges on solving the two optimal problems in
(8) by using Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. As this
proof is nearly identical to that of [6, Thm. 1], we omit it.
Based on the result of Thm. 1, we obtain a simplified
expression for conditional maximal α-leakage. Specifically,
the simplified expression for α > 1 is related to a variant
of the Sibson MI defined as follows.
Definition 6. Let PX,Y |Z=z indicate a conditional joint dis-
tribution of X,Y given an event Z = z. The event-conditional
Sibson MI between X and Y given Z = z is defined
ISα(X ;Y |Z=z)=
α
α− 1
log
∑
y
(∑
x
P (x|z)P (y|x, z)α
)1
α
(13)
for 1 < α < ∞ and by the continuous extension of (13) for
α = 1 and ∞.
Theorem 2. For α ∈ [1,∞], the conditional maximal α-
leakage defined in (9) simplifies to
Lmaxα (X → Y |Z)
=


sup
z∈supp(Z)
sup
PX˜|Z=z
≪PX|Z=z
ISα(X˜;Y |Z = z), α ∈ (1,∞]
I(X ;Y |Z), α = 1.
(14)
where supp(Z) indicates the support of Z and ISα(X ;Y |Z =
z) is defined in (13).
A detailed proof is in the Appendix. Note that given a
channel PY |X , supX I
S
α(X ;Y ) = supX I
A
α (X ;Y ) for 1 ≤
α ≤ ∞, and the quantity is called Arimoto channel capacity
[13], [14]. Thus, for α > 1, conditional maximal α-leakage is
the maximal conditional Arimoto channel capacity of channels
(from X to Y ) where the channel state is controlled by Z .
The following theorem shows a relationship between con-
ditional maximal α-leakage and maximal α-leakage.
Theorem 3. For conditional maximal α-leakage defined in
(9), if Z −X − Y holds, then
Lmaxα (X → Y |Z) ≤ L
max
α (X → Y ). (15)
Proof. From Thm. 2, we have that for α > 1
Lmaxα (X → Y |Z)
=sup
z
sup
PX˜≪PX|Z=z
α
α− 1
log
∑
y
(∑
x
PX˜(x)PY |X(y|x)
α
) 1
α
(16)
≤ sup
PX˜≪PX
α
α− 1
log
∑
y
(∑
x
PX˜(x)PY |X(y|x)
α
) 1
α
(17)
=Lmaxα (X → Y ) (18)
where (16) holds because the Markov chain Z−X−Y allows
us to replace PY |X,Z with PY |X ; and the inequality in (17) is
from the fact that for any z conditioning on Z can only reduce
the support of X ; and the equality in (18) is from Thm. 2 in
[6]. For α = 1, from Thm. 2 we have
Lmax1 (X → Y |Z) = I(X ;Y |Z), (19)
such that if Z −X − Y holds,
I(X ;Y |Z) ≤ I(X ;Y ) = Lmax1 (X → Y ), (20)
where the inequality and equality are from [15, Sec. 2.8] and
[6, Thm. 2], respectively. Therefore, for Z−X−Y , Lmaxα (X →
Y |Z) ≤ Lmaxα (X → Y ).
Thm. 3 shows that if side information (Z) and released
data (Y ) is conditionally independent on the original data
(X), the amount of information that Y can leak about X will
not increase. That is, if side information is not involved in
generating the released data from the original data, in terms
of maximal α-leakage, it will not help an adversary get more
information about the original data from the released data.
Therefore, the (unconditional) maximal α-leakage represents
a bound not only on the amount of information leaked in Y
about an arbitrary function of X , but it is also a bound on the
amount of information leaked in Y about X to an adversary
with arbitrary side-information, provided Y is generated from
X using only private randomness. This gives significant new
meaning to the maximal α-leakage. The following example
illustrates the result in Thm. 3.
Example 1. Let the original data X uniformly take values
from the binary alphabet {0, 1}, and the released data Y be
generated by a binary symmetric channel with a crossover
probability 0 < p < 0.5. Here, the maximal α-leakage from
X to Y is
Lmaxα (X → Y )
=
{
log 2 + 1
α−1 log (p
α + (1 − p)α) , α > 1
log 2−H(p), α = 1
(21)
where H(p) = −p log p − (1 − p) log(1 − p). Let the side
information Z ∈ {0, 1} be generated from X via a binary
symmetric channel with a crossover probability 0 ≤ q ≤ 0.5,
such that Z − X − Y holds. From Thm. 2, we know that
Lmaxα (X → Y |Z) = 0 for q = 0, and if q 6= 0
Lmaxα (X → Y |Z)
=
{
log 2 + 1
α−1 log (p
α + (1− p)α) , α > 1
H(p+ q − 2pq)−H(p), α = 1.
(22)
Therefore, Lmaxα (X → Y |Z) ≤ L
max
α (X → Y ) with equality if
and only if α > 1 or q = 0.5.
As a contrast, for the same binary (X,Y ) in Example 1 we
show a case in which the Markov chain Z −X − Y does not
hold, so that side information causes the released data leak
more information about the original data.
Example 2. Let side information Z ∼ Ber(p) and Z ⊥ X .
Let Y = X for Z = 0 and Y = X ⊕ 1 for Z = 1, such that
PX,Y is the same as that in Example 1. From Thm. 2, we have
Lmaxα (X → Y |Z) = log 2 > L
max
α (X → Y ) from (21).
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have shown that in a data publishing setting, when
the released data is generated from original data via private
randomness (i.e., side information is not involved in the
generation), maximal α-leakage is robust to arbitrary side
information an adversary may have. Building upon our earlier
result on composition that leakage over multiple releases can
be bounded as Lmaxα (X → (Y, Z)) ≤ L
max
α (X → Y ) +
Lmaxα (X→Z), we conjecture a tighter composition theorem
that limits leakage over multiple releases as
Lmaxα (X→(Y, Z)) ≤ L
max
α (X→Y ) + L
max
α (X→Z|Y ), (23)
thereby suggesting that successive releases should leverage
adversarial knowledge.
APPENDIX: PROOF OF THEOREM 2
From Thm. 1, we can simplify Lmaxα (X → Y |Z) in (9) as
Lmaxα (X → Y |Z) = sup
U−X−Y |Z
IAα (U ;Y |Z). (24)
For α = 1, we have
Lmax1 (X → Y |Z) = sup
U :U−(X,Z)−Y
I(U ;Y |Z). (25)
Under the Markov chain U−X−Y |Z , by the data processing
inequality, we have I(U ;Y |Z) ≤ I(X ;Y |Z) with equality if
and only if I(X ;Y |U,Z) = 0. Thus,
Lmax1 (X → Y |Z) = I(X ;Y |Z). (26)
Now consider α > 1. We first upper bound Lmaxα (X →
Y |Z). To show that this is upper bounded by the expression
in (14), we show that for any variable U satisfying the Markov
chain U − X − Y |Z , the conditional α-leakage is upper
bounded by this same expression. For any such U , we have
IAα (U ;Y |Z)
=
α
α− 1
log
∑
y,z
(∑
u
PU,Y,Z(u, y, z)
α
) 1
α
∑
z
(∑
u
PU,Z(u, z)α
) 1
α
(27)
≤
α
α− 1
log sup
z∈supp(Z)
∑
y
(∑
u
PU,Y,Z(u, y, z)
α
) 1
α
(∑
u
PU,Z(u, z)α
) 1
α
(28)
= sup
z∈supp(Z)
IAα (U ;Y |Z = z) (29)
≤ sup
z∈supp(Z)
sup
PX˜|U˜ :PX˜|U˜≪PX|Z=z
sup
PU˜
IAα (U˜ ;Y |Z = z) (30)
= sup
z∈supp(Z)
sup
PX˜|U˜ :PX˜|U˜≪PX|Z=z
sup
PU˜
ISα(U˜ ;Y |Z = z) (31)
≤ sup
z∈supp(Z)
sup
PX˜≪PX|Z=z
ISα(X˜;Y |Z = z) (32)
where
• the inequality in (28) is from the fact that for any
nonnegative ai, bi, ∑
i ai∑
i bi
≤ max
i
ai
bi
, (33)
• (29) follows by the definition of Arimito MI,
• in (30), the variables are distributed according to
PU˜ (u)PX˜|U˜ (x|u)PY |X,Z(y|x, z),
• (31) follows because Arimoto and Sibson MIs have the
same supremum over the input distribution,
• (32) follows from the facts that Sibson MI satisfies the
data processing inequality, and U˜ − X˜ − Y |Z = z forms
a Markov chain.
We now lower bound Lmaxα (X ;Y |Z) by constructing a spe-
cific U satisfying U −X − Y |Z . For a given PX,Y,Z , let
z∗= arg sup
z∈supp(Z)
sup
PX˜
≪PX|Z=z
∑
y
(∑
x
PX˜(x)PY |X,Z(y|x, z)
α
)1
α
. (34)
We will define a variable U with alphabet consisting of several
disjoint subsets. We use Xz∗ to indicate the conditional support
of X given Z = z∗, i.e., Xz∗ , {x ∈ X : PX,Z(x, z
∗) > 0}.
For each x ∈ Xz⋆ , let Ux,z⋆ be disjoint, finite sets. Also let
U0 be a finite set (disjoint from those above). The cardinality
of each of these sets will be determined later. Finally, let the
alphabet of U be U = U0 ∪
⋃
x∈Xz⋆
Ux,z⋆ . We define the
conditional distribution PU|X,Z as follows. Let
PU|X,Z(u|x, z) =


1
|Ux,z⋆ |
, z = z⋆, u ∈ Ux,z⋆
1
|U0|
, z 6= z⋆, u ∈ U0
0, otherwise.
(35)
For the constructed U above, the conditional Arimoto MI is
IAα (U ;Y |Z) =
α
α− 1
log
∑
y,z
(∑
u
PU,Y,Z(u, y, z)
α
) 1
α
∑
z
(∑
u
PU,Z(u, z)α
) 1
α
. (36)
The numerator in (36) can be written as
∑
y,z
(∑
u
PU,Y,Z(u, y, z)
α
) 1
α
=
∑
y,z
(∑
u
(∑
x
PU|X,Z(u|x, z)PX,Y,Z(x, y, z)
)α) 1α
(37)
=
∑
y,z 6=z∗
(
|U0|
(∑
x
1
|U0|
PX,Y,Z(x, y, z)
)α) 1α
+
∑
y
(∑
x
|Ux,z∗ |
(
1
|Ux,z∗ |
PX,Y,Z(x, y, z
∗)
)α) 1α
(38)
=
1− PZ(z
∗)
|U0|1−
1
α
+
∑
y
(∑
x
|Ux,z∗ |
1−αPX,Y,Z(x, y, z
⋆)α
) 1
α
(39)
where the simplification in (39) is from (35). A similar
derivation for the denominator in (36) gives
∑
z
(∑
u
PU,Z(u, z)
α
) 1
α
=
1− P (z∗)
|U0|1−
1
α
+
(∑
x
|Ux,z∗ |
1−αPX,Z(x, z
⋆)α
) 1
α
. (40)
Note that for α > 1, as |U0| → ∞, (1−PZ(z
∗)) 1
|U0|
1− 1
α
→ 0.
Therefore, for α > 1 we have
Lmaxα (X → Y |Z)
≥
α
α− 1
log
∑
y
(∑
x
|Ux,z∗ |
1−αPX,Y,Z(x, y, z
⋆)α
) 1
α
(∑
x
|Ux,z∗ |1−αPX,Z(x, z⋆)α
) 1
α
(41)
=
α
α− 1
log
∑
y


∑
x∈Xz∗
PY |X,Z(y|x, z
∗)αP (x, z∗)α|Ux,z∗ |
1−α
∑
x′∈Xz∗
P (x′, z∗)α|Ux′,z∗ |1−α


1
α
.(42)
Let X˜ ∈ Xz∗ be random variable with a distribution PX˜(x) =
PX,Z (x,z
∗)α|Ux,z∗ |
1−α
∑
x′∈Xz∗
PX,Z (x′,z∗)α|Ux′,z∗ |
1−α . By properly choosing cardi-
nalities |Ux,z∗ |, for x ∈ Xz∗ , we can approach an arbitrary
distribution PX˜ on the support Xz∗ . In addition, the lower
bound in (41) holds for any arbitrary choice of these cardinal-
ities. Therefore, we have
Lmaxα (X → Y |Z)
≥ sup
PX˜
≪PX|Z=z∗
α
α− 1
log
∑
y
(∑
x
PX˜(x)PY |X,Z(y|x, z
∗)α
)1
α
(43)
= sup
z∈
supp(Z)
sup
PX˜≪
PX|Z=z
α
α−1
log
∑
y
(∑
x
PX˜(x)PY |X,Z (y|x,z)
α
)1
α
(44)
where (44) is from the definition of z∗ in (34). From (32) and
(44), we have that for α > 1
Lmaxα (X→ Y |Z) = sup
z∈supp(Z)
sup
PX˜≪PX|Z=z
ISα(X˜ ;Y |Z = z).
(45)
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